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Abstract
Failures of government policies often provoke opposite reactions from citizens; some
call for a reversal of the policy while others favor its continuation in stronger form. We
oﬀer an explanation of such polarization, based on a natural bimodality of preferences
in political and economic contexts, and consistent with Bayesian rationality.
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1The failure of many economic policies, and indeed of other social policies or military
actions, often invokes opposite reactions from diﬀerent segments of the citizenry. Some
argue that the failure indicates the need for a reversal of the policy, while others interpret
the same evidence as showing that the policy was not followed fully or ﬁrmly enough and
arguing for a strengthening or more zealous enforcement of existing measures.
A few examples will make the point. When the British economy was performing poorly
under the Labour governments in the 1970s, the Conservatives led by Margaret Thatcher
called for drastic market-oriented reforms, while traditional Labour supporters said that
the real problem was the failure to adopt true Socialism. Similar divisions arose in former
Socialist economies as their initial attempts at market reforms met with limited and mixed
success, or in some cases outright failure and decline of the economies. One part of their
populations wanted the reforms speeded up and made more drastic, while others wanted to
slow down or even reverse the reforms and go back to many of the old Communist policies.
In these instances, many individuals wanted broadly the same results — more output and
growth — and observed the same outcomes of the prevailing policies — success or failure in
various respects — but drew divergent conclusions from these observations. Similarly large
splits of public opinion opened up in the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s
about the Vietnam war — whether to pursue it with greater force or to withdraw. Most of
the opponents of the war agreed with the proponents that a democratic Vietnam would be
desirable, but drew diﬀerent inferences from the same events. Today we witness political
polarization in many parts of the world on issues of discrimination, multiculturalism, religion,
immigration, human rights, terrorism, civil war and nuclear armament.
How can we explain such increasing polarization of opinion even when both sides are
broadly agreed on the objective of the policy and are observing the same evidence? One
could simply appeal to biases in perception and reasoning, but it would be desirable to
understand whether increased polarization is compatible with standard theories of statistical
inference. We argue that the standard locational model of policy preferences that is used
in political science and economics implies a natural bimodality that can generate temporary
polarization under Bayesian updating.1
1In a working paper that appeared after our ﬁrst draft was completed, Acemoglu, Chernozhukov and
Yildiz (October 2006) develop a model that can even generate permanent divergence of beliefs. They provide
a general theory for distinct priors, establish asymptotic results and consider applications to coordination
games, asset trading and bargaining. While they require a positive prior probability that the observed signal
is uninformative, our model of temporary polarization works even with surely informative signals.
21D e ﬁnition and General Propositions
We develop our argument in a simple model where the outcome of policy depends on some
underlying unobservable “state of the world.” Denote states of the world by points s in a
set S of possible states. Each state of the world could be a fact about or aspect of how
the world works; indeed it could be an entire “possible world”. In the case of monetary
policy, for example, the two states can be “Keynesian” and “monetarist” worlds.2 The
state of the world is ﬁxed and unaﬀected by policy, but diﬀerent policies may result in
diﬀerent outcomes.3 Actual policy outcomes are often multidimensional, complex and not
observed with much detail or accuracy. What can usually be observed is a summary indicator
of the outcome, which is subject to random disturbances of measurement and estimation.
For example, outcomes of monetary and ﬁscal policies include the eﬀects on incomes and
prices faced by millions of consumers and ﬁrms; what we observe is an index of inﬂation
or unemployment constructed by the relevant bureau of statistics. Sometimes citizens are
aware of only a binary indicator, such as an estimate of whether a policy is judged a success
or failure. Denote the random disturbance aﬀecting the observed magnitudes by u ∈ U.T h e
product set Ω = S × U is then our sample space over which probabilities are deﬁned, with
typical element (sample point) denoted by ω =( s,u).4
Neither the true state of the world s nor the disturbance u is observable. However, each
individual can observe the actual policy x that is being pursued and some (potentially noisy)
indicator y of the policy outcome, which in turn depends on the policy and the true state
of the world. Thus there is a known functional relationship, y = Y (x,s,u). Each individual
has his or her own prior probability distribution over S, the possible states of the world.
These priors may be thought of as initial “world views” or beliefs about the “true nature” of
the world we live in. Upon observing y, the individual updates his or her prior, using Bayes’
rule to obtain a posterior concerning the state of the world. This is the individual’s revised
(or conﬁrmed) world view or belief.5 The individual cannot in general infer s from x and y,
2Piketty (1995) considers a model of ﬁscal policy where individuals’ priors about the extent of equality
of opportunity in society and the eﬀectiveness of individual eﬀort diﬀer in just such a way.
3The subsequent analysis can be generalized to dynamic situations in which the state of the world is not
ﬁxed but changes over time in part depending on policy.
4Even more generally, we could consider an abstract sample space Ω e n d o w e dw i t has i g m aa l g e b r aM and
(M-measurable) random variables s and u that map sample points ω ∈ Ω to states of the world, s(ω) ∈ S,
and errors, u(ω) ∈ U,w h e r eU and S are sets in Euclidean spaces, see e.g. Billingsley (1999, pp. 16—42).
5Note that this whole situation is the opposite of the one of “agreeing to disagree” familiar to many
economists (Aumann, 1974, see also Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, 1982). There, individuals have common
3not only because of the random disturbance u but also because the mapping y = Y (x,s,u)
from s to y,g i v e nx and u, need not be one-to-one. We will assume that the probability
distribution of the random disturbance u is known, so no Bayesian revision of its probability
distribution need be made, but even this can be generalized. We assume the random draws
of s and u to be statistically independent.
Our concept of polarization of diﬀerent individuals’ probabilistic beliefs is illustrated in
Figures 1 and 2, where the horizontal axis represents a one-dimensional spectrum of states s
of the world. Figure 1 shows the prior and posterior cumulative distributions F,a n dF i g u r e
2 shows the corresponding probability density functions f, for two individuals identiﬁed by
the colors red and blue. The priors are shown as solid curves and the posteriors as dashed
curves. The prior of red is to the left of that of blue in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic
dominance. The posterior of red is even farther to the left than her prior, and the posterior
of blue is even farther to the right than his prior. We call this polarization, and examine
when it can arise.
s
F(s)
Figure 1: Polarization illustrated using cumulative distribution functions.
priors but get diﬀerent observations; here, they have diﬀerent priors but get common observations. Economic
and game-theoretic analyses often rely on an assumption of common priors on the argument that it “enables
one to zero in on purely informational issues” (Aumann 1976, p. 14) but recently departures from this
assumption have been made to “zero in on open disagreement issues”; see Van den Steen (2001, p. 5) and
Morris (1995). Indeed, open disagreement issues are often the essence of political problems.
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f(s)
Figure 2: Polarization illustrated using density functions.
It helps to start with a condition that rules out such polarization. Let g(y|x,s) be the
probability density of the observable y conditioned on the policy x and state s. Polarization
will be ruled out if, in response to a higher y, the posterior for s, calculated using Bayes’ Rule,
always shifts in the same direction in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. It is well
known that a necessary and suﬃcient condition for this is that g(y|x,s) has the monotone
likelihood ratio property (MLRP), namely that the likelihood ratio g(y|x,s1)/g(y|x,s2) for
any policy x and states s1 >s 2 is a monotone (increasing or decreasing) function of y.6
MLRP holds for many standard distributions such as the normal, which is often used
and has aﬀected thinking about polarization. Suppose the observable y is a linear function
of its arguments, with coeﬃcients set equal to 1 by choice of units:
y = x + s + u.
L e ta no b s e r v e r ’ sp r i or distribution of s – his or her “initial world view” – be normal with
mean µ and precision τs (reciprocal of variance), and let the known distribution of u be
normal with mean 0 and precision τu.W h e nx and y are observed and the distribution of
s is updated according to Bayes’ Rule, the posterior distribution for the state of the world
(the observer’s “revised world view”) is normal with mean ν given by
ν =( 1− β)µ + β(y − x),
6This property was ﬁrst identiﬁed by Rubin in the 1950’s, further developed in Karlin and Rubin (1956)






a convex combination of the prior µ and the “signal” y − x,w h i c hw ea b b r e v i a t ea sy0.T h e
precision of the posterior is τs + τu.T h u si nt h i sm o d e l ,t h ep o s t e r i o ri sm o r ep r e c i s et h a n
the prior, and a higher (lower) realization of the observable indicator y l e a d st oah i g h e r
(lower) mean of s under the posterior distribution, for any given prior µ.
Suppose two observers have diﬀerent prior means, say µ1 and µ2, and possibly diﬀerent
βs, β1 and β2. Choose the labels so that µ1 >µ 2. When the two observe the same y and
update their priors, let the posterior means be ν1 and ν2. Using the above formula for the
posterior mean, we have the following three cases:
[1] If y0 >µ 1,t h e nµ1 <ν 1 <y 0 and µ2 <ν 2 <y 0, so both distributions shift to
the right.
[2] If y0 <µ 2,t h e ny0 <ν 2 <µ 2 and y0 <ν 1 <µ 1, so both distributions shift to
the left.
[3] If µ2 <y 0 <µ 1,t h e nµ2 <ν 2 <y 0 and y0 <ν 1 <µ 1, so the two distributions
s h i f tt o w a r de a c ho t h e r .
In no case can the distributions shift as in Figures 1 and 2; polarization cannot occur.
Users of the linear-normal model then have to explain the instances of belief polarization
by invoking some biases of perception or learning to modify Bayesian updating. Gerber and
Green (1999) review this literature.
We now illustrate how the monotone likelihood ratio property fails in some politico-
economic situations where policies form a one-dimensional spectrum, such as left to right or
dove to hawk. Think of a policy as a real number. In the example of monetary policy, this
can be the rate of growth of the money supply, or the federal funds rate. If policy x is used
when the state is s, this will generate a loss, L(x,s). The individual knows the actual policy,
x, and observes an indicator of the ensuing loss. In order to contrast our approach with the
usual approach in current political science and economics, where individuals hold the same
prior but have distinct preferences and hence loss functions, we here assume that everyone
is agreed about the function L; disagreement is limited to probabilities of the states of the
world. We do not deny the realistic possibility that people also have distinct preferences.
However, heterogeneity of beliefs about the nature of the world we live in is also realistic, and
here we focus on its consequences by leaving out the other possibility. Preference diﬀerences
can be an additional reason for polarization.
6An optimal policy x∗ (s) in state s is one that minimizes the loss L(x,s). For the sake
of simplicity we assume that the optimal policy is unique in every state. Thus everyone is
agreed about the function x∗ : S → R that maps each state to its optimal policy, but people
may disagree about what policy should be chosen in order to minimize the expected loss
if they have distinct probabilistic beliefs about the true state of the world. For notational
convenience, suppose that x∗(s) ≡ s.
T h el o s si sn o td i r e c t l yo b s e r v e d ,b u to n l ya ni n d i c a t o rY (x,s,u) is observed. We consider
two cases of this.
Suppose, ﬁrst, that the function Y only takes two values; either 0, “success,” or 1,
“failure” and let X = S be a subset of the real line. Failure becomes more likely both when
the policy is farther to the right of its optimum and when it is farther to the left of the
optimum. Conversely, success becomes more likely when policy gets closer to its optimum
from either direction. The individual knows the actual policy, x, and observes whether it
succeeds or fails. So here y simply is “success or failure” of policy x.F o ry ∈ {0,1},l e t
g(y|x,s) denote the conditional probability of the event Y (x,s,u)=y, given the policy
x, state s, and observation error u.F o r y =1(“failure”), this probability increases with
the distance |x − s| between the actual and optimal policy, say g(1|x,s)=ε + δ|x − s| for
ε,δ > 0 such that g(1|x,s) is always less than one over the ranges of the variables in the




ε + δ|x − s1|
ε + δ|x − s2|




1 − ε − δ|x − s1|
1 − ε − δ|x − s2|
.
For the MLRP to hold, one of these likelihood ratios, say the ﬁrst, should always exceed the
other. This is equivalent with the requirement that either x>(s1 + s2)/2 or x<(s1 + s2)/2
for all x and s. This not being the case, the posterior may just as easily shift in one direction
as in the other, depending on the prior. Since all individuals know the policy and make the
same observation as to its success or failure, their posteriors may shift in diﬀerent directions
depending on their priors concerning the state of the world.
Secondly, consider an example where a suboptimal policy generates a loss on a continuum
scale. Common forms in the political science and economics literatures for the loss function
7are
L(x,s)=[ x − x
∗ (s)]
2 and L(x,s)=|x − x
∗ (s)|,
where x is the actual policy and x∗ (s) the optimal policy in state s.S u p p o s et h a tt h el o s s
is observed only with noise: y = Y (x,s,u)=L(x,s)+u,w h e r eu is an observation error.
Suppose the actual policy x is known, but x∗ (s) and u are not known or observed. Then
the observer will infer that, conditional on y and x,t h eo p t i m a lp o l i c yi nt h ec u r r e n ts t a t e
satisﬁes
x
∗ = x ±
√
y − u and x
∗ = x ± (y − u)
in the respective cases. Whether the plus or the minus part gets more posterior probability
weight, after x and y have been observed, and therefore whether the person’s preferred policy
shifts to the left or the right, depends on the person’s prior. Thus the usual locational or
spatial spectrum model of policy creates an automatic bimodality in revisions of beliefs about
the optimal policy.
Here are some concrete examples of bimodality. [1] Suppose country A intervenes militar-
ily in country B, and the result is violence and ethnic conﬂict in B. This could be happening
either because each ethnic group in B supports its own militants to resist A’s forces and the
militants then turn on each other, or because A’s forces are not strong enough to maintain
law and order. That is, the ideal policy could be either no intervention or a much stronger
intervention, and the actual policy may be failing in the respective cases because it is too
much or because it is too little. [2] Suppose a country is experiencing high unemployment.
Those who take a Keynesian view of the world may think this is because monetary policy
is too tight, whereas those who take a monetarist view may think that the policy is too
loose, and that businesses are not hiring because they think that the loose policy will lead
to inﬂation and then to much higher interest rates.
The kind of polarization we ﬁnd does not last for ever. Under mild technical conditions,
the diﬀerence between the posteriors eventually goes to zero when these are successively
updated following a sequence of observations (Blackwell and Dubins, 1962).7 But there
is no general guarantee that the convergence occurs monotonically. Our examples show
how divergences can temporarily increase, and thereby help us understand the process of
polarization in greater detail. Moreover, these examples show that political polarization can
arise quite naturally and consistently with Bayesian updating, without any need to invoke
7See, however, Acemoglu et al (2006) who show that if the conditional success probabilities (our table at
the bottom of p. 6) are unknown and individuals’ subjective beliefs about these are suﬃciently diﬀuse, their
posteriors will not converge even asymptotically.
8selective perception or biased learning. Of course these things exist in reality and can further
aggravate the polarization.
2 Binary indicator of success
We now develop these two examples of polarization of individual prior beliefs into fuller
models of political polarization, where the policy is chosen by majority rule applied to the
votes of the same diverse individuals. Our modeling of politics is admittedly special, but
does bring out some useful intuitions. Speciﬁcally, we assume that all voters vote, and
that they vote sincerely, that is, each voter in each election votes for his or her currently
most preferred alternative according to his or her current belief. We do not consider more
sophisticated strategic, forward-looking behavior. The context we have in mind is that of
an election with numerous voters, where each has a negligible probability of being pivotal to
the outcome, and therefore no one has the ability to manipulate the outcome strategically.8
Suppose there are ﬁve states of the world, s ∈ S = {1,2,3,4,5}, and equally many
voter types, θ ∈ Θ = {1,2,3,4,5}, with equally many voters of each type. Each voter type
holds a distinct subjective prior about the true state of the world. Table 1 shows the prior
probabilities at the start of period 1 with voter types as rows and states of the world as
columns.
Table 1 - Prior probabilities for diﬀerent types of voters
s =1 2345
θ =1 0.700 0.297 0.001 0.001 0.001
2 0.200 0.600 0.198 0.001 0.001
3 0.001 0.269 0.500 0.229 0.001
4 0.001 0.001 0.198 0.600 0.200
5 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.297 0.700
The general motivation behind these speciﬁc numbers is as follows. [1] Each type of voter
8See Laslier and Weibull (2007) for a rigorous analysis of this issue. Strategic voting under a common
prior but private signals is modeled by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1998). Experimental evidence for small electorates (3 or 6 voters) gives some (but not strong) support to
strategic voting; see Guarnaschelli, McKElvey and Palfrey (2000). Degan and Merlo (2007) ﬁnd that “by
and large sincere voting can explain virtually all of the individual-level observations on voting behavior in
presidential and congressional U.S. elections in the data."
9assigns high positive probability to the state of the world corresponding to his type, a signif-
icant probability for it being one position away from his type, but very small probabilities
for it being farther away.9 [2] Extremist individuals attach higher probabilities to their own
type being the “right” type. [3] The voter of type 3 has a slightly higher prior probability
of the state being 2 than it being 4.
There are ﬁve policies: Far Left (FL), Left (L), Center (C), Right (R) and Far Right
(FR), which we label x =1 ,2,...,5. Formally, X = S. The loss function equals 1 if the
policy fails and 0 if it succeeds. Therefore minimization of expected loss is equivalent to
minimizing the probability of failure. Then x =1(FL) is the (unique) optimal policy in
state 1, x =2(L) the optimal policy in state 2 etc. Formally: x∗ (s)=s for all s ∈ S.
We develop the example assuming that the true state of the world is 4, so x =4(R) is the
optimal policy.
At any time, the voter can observe what policy is actually being followed, and can observe
a binary indicator of the outcome (success or failure). Table 2 shows the probabilities of
failure for each policy in each state of the world (with policies as rows and states of the
world as columns):
Table 2 - Probabilities of failure for available policies in each state of the world
s =1 2345
x =1 0.01 0.2 0.4 0.7 1
2 0.2 0.01 0.2 0.4 0.7
3 0.4 0.2 0.01 0.2 0.4
4 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.01 0.2
5 1 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.01
The policy x =1is optimal in state 1 and fails with probability only 0.01, but it is
farther from optimal in states 2, 3, 4, and 5, and fails with higher probabilities. Similarly
for other policies. Thus there is a small probability that even the optimal policy will fail,10
and failure probabilities rise when the actual policy is farther away from the optimal. Note
9Even a voter of one extreme type attaches positive (albeit very small) probability to the state of the oppo-
site extreme type; the priors are non-dogmatic. This is to alleviate any concern that zero prior probabilities
might be driving our results.
10As with our previous assumption of non-dogmatic priors, we introduce these small probabilities of failure
of ideal policies so as to mitigate any reader’s concern that our results are being driven by Bayesian updating
on zero probability events.
10that policy 3 is optimal in state 3, its failure probability is higher when the true state is 2
or 4, and higher still when the true state is 1 or 5. This is the natural bimodality that arises
in the spatial model, and drives our results.
We assume that each type of voter knows the table of failure rates. In period 1, given
their priors, each type’s sincere vote is for the policy that coincides with his type. Preferences
are single-peaked, and the outcome is the median voter’s preferred policy, which in this case
is 3. So policy x =3is adopted. Suppose, however, that policy 3 leads to failure. The voters
now revise their priors using Bayes’ Rule. The posterior from period 1 become the priors at
the start of period 2. For each voter type, the posterior probability that the true state is j
is proportional to
Pr(Failure | s = j and x =3 )∗ PriorPr(s = j).
The actual probabilities are found by normalizing these products. Table 3 shows these
products, with voter types as rows and states as columns:
Table 3 - Products of prior and conditional probabilities
s =12 3 4 5
θ =1 0.28 0.0594 0.00001 0.0002 0.0004
2 0.08 0.12 0.00198 0.0002 0.0004
3 0.0004 0.0538 0.005 0.0458 0.0004
4 0.0004 0.0002 0.00198 0.12 0.08
5 0.0004 0.0002 0.00001 0.0594 0.28
Then Table 4 shows (to four signiﬁcant digits) the resulting posteriors, found by dividing
each entry by the sum of all the cells in its row (still with voter types as rows and states as
columns).
Table 4 - Period 1 posterior probabilities for diﬀerent types of voters
s =1 2345
θ =10 . 8 2 3 50 . 1 7 4 70 . 0 0 0 00 . 0 0 0 60 . 0 0 1 2
2 0 . 3 9 4 90 . 5 9 2 40 . 0 0 9 80 . 0 0 1 00 . 0 0 2 0
3 0 . 0 0 3 80 . 5 1 0 40 . 0 4 7 40 . 4 3 4 50 . 0 0 3 8
4 0 . 0 0 2 00 . 0 0 1 00 . 0 0 9 80 . 5 9 2 40 . 3 9 4 9
5 0 . 0 0 1 20 . 0 0 0 60 . 0 0 0 00 . 1 7 4 70 . 8 2 3 5
11Now consider period 2 voting, given these as the new priors. Voter types 1, 2, 4, and 5
obviously vote for their corresponding policies 1,2, 4 and 5, respectively. But voter type 3’s
prior has become bimodal because the observed failure of policy 3 causes him to revise that
probability drastically. So we must be more careful and calculate voter type 3’s estimate of
the probability of failure for all ﬁve policies in order to determine his most preferred policy,
given his new prior. The failure probability of each policy i ∈ X is
Σj Pr(Failure|s = j and x = i) ∗ New PriorPr(s = j).
Table 5 shows the result of this calculation:
Table 5 - Voter type 3’s assessment of policy failure probabilities
x =10 . 4 2 9 1
20 . 1 9 1 8
30 . 1 9 2 5
40 . 2 2 2 2
50 . 4 6 7 0
So voter 3’s preferences are still single-peaked, and his best choice is 2; this is his new
most preferred policy. Therefore the median voter is at 2, and policy 2 is adopted — policy
shifts in the “wrong” direction. Suppose policy x =2also leads to failure. Now the Bayesian
revision yields posteriors shown in Table 6:
Table 6 - Period 2 posterior probabilities for diﬀerent types of voters
s =12 3 4 5
θ =10 . 9 8 3 20 . 0 1 0 4 3 . 5 E - 50 . 0 0 1 40 . 0 0 4 9
2 0.8911 0.0668 0.0221 0.0045 0.0156
3 0.0040 0.0266 0.0495 0.9061 0.0138
4 0 . 0 0 0 81 . 9 E - 50 . 0 0 3 8 0 . 4 5 9 40 . 5 3 6 0
5 0 . 0 0 0 41 . 9 E - 69 . 1 E - 60 . 1 0 8 10 . 8 9 1 5
So voter type 3 has an epiphany — his probability distribution switches drastically to
state 4. Hence, his most preferred policy is now 4. And the others become polarized: even
type 4’s most preferred policy now switches to 5.
This example serves to make three points: [1] Even slight asymmetries in initial beliefs
can build into substantial diﬀerences. [2] Polarization can occur in a way that even voters
12who are moderately biased in one direction come to favor the extreme policy in that direction.
[3] The outcome of an election can be determined by the switching of a very small number of
the centrist type 3 voters, but everyone else is polarized to favor extreme policies; therefore
the outcome is likely to cause a lot of dispute and acrimony.
3 Observable continuous loss
Our second example allows policies to range over a continuum. Here we focus on the pos-
sibility that polarization can arise because the function Y (x,s,u) is not monotonic in x;
therefore we assume that there is no error term u.Voters are denoted by an index θ ranging
over the unit interval, and for simplicity of exposition they are assumed to be uniformly
distributed over this range. Each voter has a continuous prior distribution about the true
state of the world s,w h e r es ranges over S = R, the real line. The prior probability density
function of voter θ is fθ,t h a ti s ,θ assigns probability fθ (s)ds to the event that the true
state of the world lies in the interval (s,s + ds).L e tX = S.
The loss associated with an outcome is equal to the absolute value of the diﬀerence
between the actual policy and state. The optimal policy in any state s is thus x = s,t h a t
is, x∗ (s) ≡ s.W r i t i n gx for the actual policy, the observable is therefore given by
y = L(x,s)=|x − s|.
Voter θ likes best the policy x that minimizes the expected loss, Eθ[L(x,s) | x],c a l c u l a t e d





|x − s|fθ(s)ds =
Z x
−∞













fθ(s)ds =2 Fθ(x) − 1=0 ,





θ(x)=2 fθ(x) > 0,
so the second-order condition is globally satisﬁed. Therefore the optimum is given by Fθ(x)=
131
2. Hence, voter θ’s most preferred policy xθ is the median of his prior distribution over the
states of the world. Moreover, each voter’s preferences are single-peaked around his most
preferred policy.
Consider the ﬁrst election (Period 1) under this set-up. Under majority rule, the median
of the most preferred policies becomes the chosen policy. To keep the notation simple,
suppose this is the point 0 on the policy spectrum. Suppose the optimal policy, in the true
state of the world, is diﬀerent from this; for the sake of deﬁniteness suppose the true state
is s =1and hence x∗ =1 .
The actual policy and the loss are by assumption observable without error. These ob-
servations enable people to infer that the true state must be either s+ = x + L(x,s) or
s− = x − L(x,s). Thus the continuous prior is updated to a two-point posterior. To keep
the notation simple again, suppose L(x,s)=1 .W i t h x =0 , the posteriors then become




and Pr[s = −1] = 1 − Pr[s =1 ].
Suppose there is a number z>1
2 such that the priors of voters in the range 0 <θ<z
satisfy fθ(−1) >f θ(1), and the priors of voters in the range z<θ<1 satisfy fθ(−1) <f θ(1).
Figure 3 below illustrates this, with red curves showing the prior densities of voters θ<z
and the blue curves those of voters θ>z .
s
Figure 3: Prior densities for diﬀerent types of voter.
14Then the voters in [0,z) have posteriors with Pr(s = −1) > 1
2 > Pr(s =1 ) ,a n dt h o s ei n
[z,1] have posteriors with Pr(s = −1) < 1
2 < Pr(s =1 ) . These posterior become the new
priors in the next election (Period 2). Therefore in that election more than half of the voters
vote for the policy x = −1, their new most preferred policy, and fewer than half vote for
the policy x =1 , their new most preferred policy. Whereas the election in Period 1 was a
contest with a continuum of opinions leading to a moderate policy (albeit not the optimal,
given the state), the election in Period 2 is polarized between two quite distinct positions,
and the choice shifts away from the optimal policy. This can happen even if z is very close
to one half.
With the optimal policy at 1 and the actual policy at −1, the outcome in Period 2 will
be a loss equal to 2. With the priors concentrated on 1 and −1, and the actual policy at −1,
this loss can arise only if the optimal policy is 1. Therefore Bayesian updating will lead to a
convergence of opinions at the optimal policy, and that policy will be adopted unanimously
in the election of Period 3.
In this example, once again quite small diﬀerences among voters can create polarization,
and non-monotonic shifts in priors. However, the special structure with no error term in
the loss function leads to quick reversal of the polarization and convergence to the optimal
policy. An error term with a suitably large dispersion can slow down this process. We omit
the details because the algebra gets complicated.
4C o n c l u d i n g c o m m e n t s
We have seen how an electorate can become polarized and policies can shift away from
the optimal, when the observable indicators of policy outcomes are not monotonic in the
policy choice, and how such polarization is perfectly consistent with voters agreeing on
values and using Bayesian updating and vote for the conditionally optimal policy given their
information.
Political polarization entails quite serious risks; political debates get bitter and the very
existence of a civil society may be threatened. Current examples are policies concerning
discrimination, immigration, gender, religion, welfare state, human rights, terrorism, civil
wars, national sovereignty and nuclear armament. One way to reduce these risks, therefore,
is to attempt to create observable indicators that are not bimodal like the ones above, and
satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property. Of course that can still leave untouched the
additional problems caused by biased perception and learning. Moreover, such indicators
15may be hard to identify. However, our argument unambiguously supports the case for search-
ing out and publicizing such indicators–under the here maintained hypothesis that people
broadly agree on values but may have diﬀering beliefs about the world. Contrary to the cur-
rent tendency in many countries to avoid high-lighting socially and politically controversial
and pressing issues, our simple examples suggest that political polarization may be reduced
rather than increased if instead more information about the factual current situation and
the eﬀect of employed policies are made available in the public debate, even when the issues
at hand are controversial.
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